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Abstract
End of the cold war following the disintegration of the Soviet Union witnessed unprecedented 
increase in militancy and terrorism prompted by internal and external forces. This was 
also fuelled by factors like religious fundamentalism and ethno-nationalist chauvinism. 
The newly independent countries of the Central Asian region encountered myriad problems 
like terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, organized crime, separatism, and ethnic 
conflicts. Given the geographical proximity and historicity, Central Asia is regarded as 
Russia’s own backyard and a “soft underbelly”. The near-abroad security developments in 
the Central Asian republics have great influence on Russia and could create a complex 
environment detrimental to its security interests. The Russian approach to this challenge 
is of great importance for the stability of the whole area. Any negative developments in 
Central Asian Regions and Afghanistan would have serious security implications for Russia. 
A stable and friendly government in Afghanistan and Central Asian states would prove 
beneficial to Russian security, including the on ongoing separatist movements in Chechnya 
and Dagestan. Therefore it is imperative that Russia and Central Asian states act collectively 
to counter religious radicalism and foster regional stability. This article examines some factors 
responsible for breeding terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asian Republics and its 
security implications onRussia such as Central Asian threats, US presence in Central Asia 
and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Keywords:Terrorism, religious extremism, security, Central Asia, Russia, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya.  
                                                           Introduction
Terrorism has gained prominence as among the non-traditional threats in the world. 
Combating this threat is a major issue confronting most of the governments in the world 
today. It has assumed a new dimension with the formation of international ideological, 
financial and technological networks. These linkages have made terrorism a potent source 
of destabilization, both regionally and internationally. The September 11, 2001 attack on 
World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States of America has unveiled the bad face 
of this new menace. Though this threat is evident everywhere, in some form or other, it is 
more serious in countries like Russia and the Central Asian Republic (CARs).
After the implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as a major player in the Central Asian 
geo-political order. However religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia has not only 
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threatened the geo-strategic interests of Russia but also created a complex environment in 
security interest. Russia has been facing challenges from religious extremism and terrorism 
in Chechnya and Dagestan emanating from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Russia 
considers Central Asia to be an important region with vital geo-strategic, security and 
economic interests and is keen in maintaining peace and stability in this region. Any negative 
developments in Central Asian regions and Afghanistan would therefore have serious 
security implications for Russia. So, a stable and friendly government in Afghanistan and 
Central Asian states free from religious radicalism and terrorism is what Russia favours.
Brief Background
In the beginning of the last century, Sir Hartford Mackinder, a geo-political theorist 
postulated his ‘Heartland Theory’ that dwelt upon the geopolitical importance of the 
Eurasian heartland, bounded by the Volga and Yangtse Rivers and the Himalayas in the 
south and the Arctic Ocean in the north. His theory has never been fully tested however it 
highlighted the strategic significance of the Central Asian region. Central Asia is fortunate 
to be situated in one of the most geostrategic locations of the world, in the core of Eurasia 
that seminally Zbigniew Brzezinski once coined “the center of world power” (Zbigniew, 
1998, p. 13). Without doubt, its position between Russia, China, and Iran, and being at the 
crossroads of the trade and energy routes, along with the region’s vast energy resources 
are adequate evidence of its importance. Today, the region consists of the former Soviet 
Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which all 
declared their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The five republics share not 
only a common social and cultural heritage, but also a number of security threats such 
as religious radicalism, crime, corruption, ethnic and civil conflict, water disputes, border 
tensions, and drug trafficking. Nevertheless according to a number of authors “the revival 
and radicalization of Islam” has been the most notable development and major threat for the 
post-soviet Central Asia (McGlinchey, 2005, p. 336). Indeed, the series of terrorist attacks that 
Kazakhstan experienced in the last months of 2011, most of them committed by a previously 
unknown Islamic terrorist organization – Jund- al-Khilafa (Soldiers of the Caliphate), have 
once again highlighted the enduring and critical problem of Islamic extremism that the 
whole region of Central Asia has been facing since the demise of the USSR. In fact, the 
latest and most appalling incident, the suicide bombing in Taraz on the 12th of November 
2011,that killed no less than 30 people has stunned the country, (Lillies, 2011). Indeed, 
“while jihadist terrorism has been a part of the Central Asian political landscape for a long 
time, these events deserve special attention,” as this surprising number of attacks were 
inflicted on the most stable and secular state of the region namely Kazakhstan.
Central Asian Terror Conundrum
Radical Islamic opposition movements have a long history in Central Asia dating back to the 
Tsarist era. Though these states are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam and among 
the most secularized areas of the Muslim world, radicalism has made a forceful comeback in 
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the past three decades. During World War I, for example, Islamic militants took up arms to 
oppose the Russian government’s attempts to mobilize Muslims to work in the front. Again, 
in the 1920s, Muslim partisans in the so-called Basmachi movement opposed the Bolshevik 
takeover and the advance of soviet power into Central Asia (Hill, 2003, p. 2).  And, the 
most recent resurgence of Islamic opposition was spurred by the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. This tied Central Asia’s and Afghanistan’s fates together in many respects. 
Central Asian Muslims sent to fight in Afghanistan gained new appreciation for their history 
and religion and drew inspiration from the mujahidin fighters who opposed the invasion. 
By the late 1980s, alien Islamic proselytizing had gathered speed across the Muslim regions 
of the former Soviet Union, and had resulted in the spread of radical ideologies, militancy, 
and terrorism. Worst hit has been the Russian North Caucasus and some parts of Central 
Asia, especially the Ferghana valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Radical Islamists have long been interested in Central Asia, a historic centre of classical 
Islam located in a region of strategic importance. Yet, they entered the region in significant 
numbers only since the late 1980s, as it had been closed off to the rest of the Islamic world 
by decades of harsh Soviet rule (Baran, 2006, p. 7). After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, international Muslim brigades were 
establishedto provide manpower for Islamist insurgents to operate in Central Asia.
The central spot of the Islamic radicalization and extremism has been identified with 
the Ferghana Valley region, a densely populated and ethnically Uzbek territory divided 
politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, where the “Islamic sentiment has 
already expressed itself since the early 1990’s” (Cornell, 2002, p. 199). In fact, Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan have since then been recognized as the most conflict-prone countries of 
the region  as the former gave birth to one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations - 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the latter experienced a vicious five year civil 
war, also known as Tajiki Civil War between 1992-1997. Uzbekistan is therefore the birth 
place of the notorious IMU, along with its splinter groups the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT). The formerwhich is considered responsible 
for numerous terrorist attacks in Central Asia (Cordesman, 2011 Online Web) has forged 
links with al-Qaida and has operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the NATO forces 
(Nichol, 2010). Though its first step was mainly against Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan, 
the IMU has declared as its main objective to “overthrow the secular governments of 
Central Asia and to establish an Islamic Caliphate” (Buszynski, 2005, p. 547).  Although 
the group has been inactive in Uzbekistan since 2001, it continues to operate out of the 
country’s borders.In fact members of the IJU have been arrested even in Germany in 2007-8 
(Chaudet, 2008, p. 19). Another radical group that has found fertile ground in Central Asia 
and has shared the goal of the creation of a caliphate in the region is Hizbut-Tahrir al-
Islami (Party of Liberation - HT). However, HT is first of all a political organization with 
international activity that initially appeared in Central Asia in the middle of the 1990s. 
Moreover, although the emergence of the group in the area was initially considered a “Uzbek 
phenomenon” (Karagiannis, 2010), it has also thousands ofmembers and supporters in each 
of the five republics, despite the fact that it “uses propaganda to disseminate its stated goal 
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of non-violent means of overthrowing of Western governments,” (Amanbayeva, 2009, p. 
173). Tajikistan also has deeply suffered from extremist violence, since its independence it 
became not only the terrain of a murderous civil war (1992-1997) between the Communists 
and the Islamists (McGlinchey, 2005, p. 338), but has also unintentionally offered refuge 
to the IMU, which joined the war on the side of the Islamists and has since then used the 
country as “a conduit for its operations” (Menon, 2003, p. 190) in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and the greater area. Indeed, with the exception of Turkmenistan, the other states of Central 
Asia, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have already been confronting 
regional threat in the face of IMU and its splinter groups, according to Didier Chaudet, an 
“‘Al-Qaedian’ threat,” (Chaudet, 2008, p. 4).
Causes Behind Terrorism and Religious Extremism in Central Asia
Since their independence Central Asians Republics have become an area of economic 
failure, political repression and growing source of Islamic extremism. While the region 
continues to be the most promising in terms of its energy resourcesand its geo-strategic 
location, radical Islam remains a cause of great concern for these republics. Therefore any 
attempt at understanding and examining the problem of religious extremism in Central Asian 
Republics would be futile without mentioning the root causes of the problem. According to 
Meena Singh Roy, a Central Asian expert, five major causes can be attributed to this rising 
religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asian states (Roy, 2004: 186-187), i.e. break-
up of Soviet Union and creation of ideological vacuum, rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, 
hard-line and repressive policies of Central Asian regimes, unemployment and poor living 
conditions and lack of democratic and economic reforms.
 Break-up of Soviet Union1. 
The breakup of Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum in this region. After 
independence, Islamic revival swept through this whole region. Under soviet system all 
forms of religious expression were repressed in these states. Therefore when the soviet 
empire fell apart, the people of Central Asia who had been forced to renounce or hide 
their religion for 74 years, saw at last the opportunity to connect themselvesspiritually and 
culturally with the Islamic past. However, in recent years Islam as a religious tradition and as 
a form of ‘cultural and political identity’ has acquired new meaning in Central Asian republics 
(Laqueur, 2003, pp. 190-91). After independence,a whole lot of Islamic missionaries from 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and many other countries had been pouring into Central 
Asian Republics. However the religious fervor of Central Asian Republics wasnot handled 
carefully by the rulers of this region. Instead the highly centralized, post-soviet ruling 
elites adopted repressive measures which created internal unrest situation where religious 
extremist operating in the neighboring states could easily cultivate support for their cause 
(Rashid, 2002b, pp. 5-6). 
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 Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan2. 
Afghanistan has always been crucial to the security of Central Asian states. The rise of 
Taliban in Afghanistan set in place a model of extremist Islamic fundamentalism unknown 
in this part of this Muslim world. With the help of Saudi extremist Osama bin Laden, 
Taliban ruledAfghanistan (1996-2001) became a base for exporting Islamic militancy to 
neighboring countries. It became a centre for training the terrorist and spreading instability 
in the region (Rashid, 1999, p. 7; Roy, 2004, pp. 186-189). 
 Hard line policies of Central Asian Regimes3. 
Shortsighted hard line policies of the Central Asian regimes (Kazhakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) have also helped the militants cause. As far as 
internal situation in these republics is concerned, we find that there is growing dissatisfaction 
among the elites as well as other section of society against the ruling regimes of CARs. 
There is repressionof oppositionparties, Islamic groups and the media by Central Asian 
elites. Mohammad Solih, leader of Uzbekistan’s banned freedom party, who has been in 
exile in Norway since 1992, wrote in the New York times on March 11, 2002 that “twelve 
years have passed but the democratic human rights abuseby one party state has not changed 
and neither has western support for them.” He further stated, “Karimov shows it is possible 
to gain prestige and money and extend your role on a whim and still gain American support 
in the post terrorism world” (Rashid, 2002:8). According to Boris Shikhmuradov, the former 
foreign minister of Turkmenistan , “there has been stagnation in Central Asia for ten years 
and now all the presidents are trying to extend their political life (Rashid, 2002a, p. 210). 
 Poverty and Unemployment4. 
Poverty and unemployment is on the rise in most of these states especially in the Ferghana 
valley, the hub of extremism, is another reason for terrorism and religious extremism. According 
to World Development Report and World Bank (2009), up to 46.7% of the population lives 
below poverty line in Tajikistan, 31.7% in Kyrgyzstan and 26% in Uzbekistan (World 
Development Report, 2012). Well known Uzbek political scientist, BahudirMusayev, is of 
the opinion that declining living standard in Uzbekistan has given fresh strength to the IMU 
detachments from the Ferghana valley. Brutal repression by the ruling elites has alienatedthe 
unemployed who are already dislodged by the lack of economic opportunity and disillusioned 
with the persistent institutional failure of the government to provide even the barest semblance 
of a just and efficient state. Consequently, Islamic militant network easily recruit more fighters 
from these ranks (Makerenko, JanesIntelligence Review, 2002, pp.  30-33).
5.  Lack of Democratic Reforms
The progress made by all five republics on the path to economic and political reforms 
has slowed down. Many critical economic reforms are stillborn or incomplete, and state 
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controlled and corruption remains pervasive. In this context Ahmed Rashid has stated in his 
book “Taliban Militant, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia” that America, Russia and 
China regard the dictatorial regimes of Central Asia as allies against an Islamic fundamentalist 
threat. However not one of them is working for the kind of democratization and development 
that would undercut the appeal of Islamic revolutionary movements in the region. He has very 
forcefully argued that repercussion and poverty are the root causes of this problem. So long 
as poverty and unemployment increases and economic opportunities decreases, the Central 
Asian states provide fertile ground for any radical organization to operate. Therefore, any 
attempt to militarily defeat these Islamic revolutionary movements, will not eliminate the 
true causes. Only development and democratization can help in combating this menace of 
religious extremism in CAR’s (Rashid, 2002, p. 228).
 Ethnic dimension and Religious extremism6. 
Some ethnic analysts have examined systematically the ethnic dimension of religious 
extremism, political violence, and terrorism in the Central Asian states (Omelicheva, 
2010, p. 167; Omelicheva, 2007). These studies have demonstrated that ethnic minorities 
residing in the territories of the Central Asian republics, particularly, Uzbeks in Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and Tajiks in Uzbekistan, have been attracted 
to radical Islamic groups and have become involved in the acts of political violence and 
terrorism. Islamic radicalism has become an expression of ethnic identity, particularly 
for Uzbeks leaving in the Kyrgyz and Tajik parts of the Ferghana valley. The growing 
authoritarianism of the Central Asian governments, assaults on religious freedoms, and 
social and informal constraints on cultural and political rights of the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic 
minorities have contributed to the greater popularization of radical Islamic organizations 
among these ethnic groups. (Omelicheva, 2007). Though Central Asian terrorism is much 
influenced by drug trafficking, small arms trading and ethnic dimensions, and its patronage 
by states across borders has become more potent in the post-independent period.After 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the emergence of Taliban with patronage from 
Pakistan, and its spread to Central Asian states, particularly to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
has created a dangerous platform to convert Central Asia into a hotbed of terrorism and 
Islamic extremism. (Mahapatra, 2008). One would like to underscore the fact that although 
there is certainly a link between terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asia, much of 
the extremism that we see is fueled by the radicalization of politics in the region rather than 
by political Islam, as governments have steadily narrowed the space for legitimate political 
opposition and broad-based public participation in politics.
Security Implications for Russia
Any attempt to understand Russia’s evolving role in Central Asia would be futile without 
identifying the major security threats that it is facing today.  As a Great Power or a former 
Great Power aspiring to regain its lost status, Russia cannot merely consider security 
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problems arising from within its borders, but from neighbouring countries as well. There 
are two areas where potential religious extremism and terrorist threat could have an impact 
on Russian security. First is the threatfrom post-soviet Central Asian states. Second,is the 
US presence in Central Asia and thirdly there is a threat fromAfghanistan, or to be more 
precise, the Afghan and the Pakistani Pashtun area where the Taliban and their foreign 
jihadist auxiliaries are based (Chaudet, 2009: 51). 
Central Asian Threats to Russian Security
Stability in Central Asia is indeed crucial for Russian security and its domestic politics. There 
are a number of reasonswhy a stable Central Asia is in the interest of Russia. Among of the 
important factors are resurgence of Taliban and problem of Islamic extremism emerging out 
of Afghanistan; drug trafficking and smuggling of arms; and weapons proliferation (The 
Hindu, 2 Feb 2006). The traditional political and military dimension of security has largely 
lost its dominant role in the contemporary Russian perception of security. The National 
Security concept, drafted by the Security Council of the Russian federation and approved 
by a presidential decree on December 17, 1997, indicates for instance, that “the analysis of 
threat to the national security of the Russian Federation reveals that most of those threats are 
currently and in the foreseeable future is of a non military nature (Horsman, 2005, p. 209).
These include the threats posed by drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, degradation 
of the environment, challenges of mass migration and Islamic radicalism. An analysis of 
Russia’s threat perceptionin relation to Central Asia’s position in these reveals that the Central 
Asian Republics are at the center stage in these perceptions (Roy, 2001, pp. 456-60). These 
new states, with their inherent regime weaknesses are faced with mixed problems like ethnic 
and religious disputes, drug trafficking arms smuggling and Islamic extremism. Moreover, 
the fight among the various countries for greater control over the enormous energy resources 
of Central Asia threatens Russia’s geo-strategic role in this region.Despite this, under no 
circumstances would Russia allow its position to diminish in this region. To safeguard its 
security interests in the Central Asian Republics, Moscow is making every possible effort to 
maintain a pivotal role in the region.
The ethno-nationalist conflict in Tajikistan in May, 1992 proved instrumental in giving an 
assertive turn in pushing the Russian policy towards the Central Asian states. As a result, 
after an initial phase of indifferent policy, Russia made concerted efforts to restore its 
economic domination as well as military grip over Central Asia with a view of deterring all 
external and regional powers from filling the geo-political gap and strategic access in the 
region. Undoubtedly, ‘soft security’ (Alam, 2008, p. 174) concerns have already attracted 
Russia to get entrenched in the Central Asian affairs. But Russia needs a forward based 
approach particularly towards any possible infiltrations of Islamic radical forces from its 
southern region which are bent on civil war in Chechnya and other Russian republics. The 
spread of radical Islam from Afghanistan into the bordering Central Asian countries of 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan - often referred to as Russia’s “soft underbelly”- 
is something Moscow fears, especially if its war against Islamists insurgents in Chechnya 
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continues (Withington, 2002, p. 42). So Russia’s military presence in the Central Asian states 
of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will not only help keep an eye on the states of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran and other countries, but also respond to threats when the need arises. 
Apart from this Russia will also be able to become an important power broker in the regions 
politics by having the ability to mediate local conflicts that often develop along ethnic 
lines. Simultaneously, it can exploit Russian diasporas to prevent regional ethno-national 
unrest. The success in the Afghanistan war may also help put down Russian concerns about 
the Taliban gaining a foothold in Central Asia. The Central Asia states are home to many 
ethnic Russian and also contain significant Russian military facilities. Russia fears that any 
coup by radical Islamist elements within its Southern neighbors’that might install regimes 
sympathetic to the Taliban may resultin influx ofabout 10 million  ethnic Russian refugees 
arriving at the doorstep of the mother Russia. Destabilization of any state in this region 
would mean, at the very least, a larger flow of Muslim emigrants from Central Asia to 
Russia. Additional Central Asian immigrants could trigger the Russian extreme right further, 
stir anti-Muslim sentiment in the population, and reinforce links with criminal groups 
operating in the country in question. It is exactly for these reasons that Moscow decided to 
intervene in the Tajik civil war (Johnson, 2006, p. 44). It was this possibility along with the 
Chechen concerns that led Russia to hedge its bets and support a united front government in 
Afghanistan and anti terrorism coalition force led by USA.
US Presence in Central Asia
Another security implication to Russia is the increasing presence of US forces in the Central 
Asian region. America’s war on international terrorism resulted in a US led NATO military 
presence in the Central Asian region posing direct challenge to Russia’s security interest. 
In Central Asia, the USA increased its influence, especially after 2001 anti-Taliban war. Its 
economic and strategic interest found synergy after the 11 September bombings. American 
troops were stationed in a region that is on the border of two potential global adversaries – 
Russia and China (Buszyniski, 2005:546). Troops are also embedded in a region near the 
Caspian states where its energy interests and investments could be backed up by force if 
necessary. By becoming the major economic and security player in the region, Russia does 
not expectto be marginalized by the United States or any other potential competitor in the 
region. After the humiliation of the 1990s and Russia’s marginalization as a great power - 
supported by the West in general and by the U.S. in particular - it is quite rational that the 
presence of another great power, in an area it considers as its zone of influence, irks Russia. 
It is even more so considering the persistency with which the U.S. has sought to strengthen 
the Central Asian states independence, something that has been seen by Russia as a way to 
limit Moscow’s political influence (Wishnik, 2002, p. 5). The Russian point of view has been 
clearly expressed by VyacheslavAlekseevichNikonov, director of the influential Russian 
think tank PolityFoundation (Online Web): “We [Russia] and the Western countries have 
diametrically opposite definitions of success in our policy toward the CIS [Commonwealth 
of Independent States] countries. For Russia, success lies in strengthening of integration 
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ties, rapprochement with its neighbours and a strengthening of cooperation. For the West, 
on the contrary, success means distancing these countries from Russia, a reorientation to 
external centres of power aimed at preventing ‘a rebirth of the Russian empire’. When 
political goals are so diametrically opposed, it is impossible to speak of a common agenda.” 
(Bhadrakumar, 2008, p. 10). Since, from the Russian point of view, there is no overlapping 
“common agenda”, it is logical to see the Kremlin as systematically trying to limit U.S. 
influence in Central Asia, in particular its symbol, the American military bases. It can be 
seen as part of the “Putinian Reaction” and Russia’s attempt to reclaim its great power 
status. In July 2005, it became clear that Russia was one of the architects of the termination 
of all American operations in Uzbekistan, and the subsequent evacuation from the famous 
Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air-base (BBC News, 2005). In the same way, it is no surprise that 
the Kyrgyz president, KurmanbekBakyev, announced in Moscow on February 3, 2009, 
that the air-base on Kyrgyz soil, in Manas, had outlasted its original goals linked to the 
War on Terror. Indeed, in the same period, Russia and the other Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) members agreed to create a rapid-reaction military force that should 
be able to answer regional security threat and terrorism. 
During the Yelstin era Central Asia lapsed into the backburner, but Putin revived Russia’s 
interest to strengthen its role in the region because of Islamic radicalism, fear of displacement 
by Americans and the presence of oil and natural gas reserves. Since Putin’s accession to 
leadership in Russia, the country’s foreign policy has shifted to give it a stronger “near abroad” 
(Roy, 2001, p. 457) orientation. Later, the Chechnya conflict, which brought Vladimir Putin 
to power, also forced Russian government to adopt a more active and determined policy 
of reversing the trend and strengthening Russian influence in Central Asia. This facilitated 
Russia’s increased military and economic presence in Central Asia following the stationing 
of American troops in the region in 2001. Russia’s expansion of its presence was made 
possible due to the earlier steps taken by Russia to remain engaged with the region right 
since the Tajik Civil War beginning in 1992. The signing of the Collective Security Treaty 
(CST) that year resulted in massive troop deployment along the Tajik-Afghan border and 
guaranteeing the security of Tajikistan from external aggression. As for the Russian 201st 
Motorized Rifle Division, which has been stationed on Tajik territory since the Soviet 
period, it supported the anti-Islamists faction from the very beginning (Johnson, 2006, p. 
45). Such an approach is rational in the short term: the goal is to obtain stability, regardless 
of costs. The Tajik Islamists were close to the Afghan mujahidin, something that could only 
bode ill for Moscow. Russia’s role in Central Asian security further expanded to support 
the Northern Alliance during Taliban days in power in Kabul. Uzbekistan, which had left 
the treaty of Collective Security, signed bilateral agreements on military and military-
technical cooperation, described as Russian-Uzbek relations as “strategic partnership” (The 
Hindu, 2006, p. 10). Later, the chain of events in Dagestan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan increased the common fear of Islamic extremism and provided president Putin 
with a platform to suggest closer cooperation in the military and security fields which also 
supplanted to reorient the Central Asian states back towards Russia. As such Russia wants 
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a strong presence in its former territories is to deter the US from gaining any footing in the 
region.
Afghanistan Terror and Russian Security
Terrorists in Afghanistan pose another security problem to Russia. As a turbulent neighbour 
threatening the stability of the Central Asian states in the last two or three decades and as the 
safe haven of international terrorists, Afghanistan is of great concern for Russian security. 
Of security concern for Russia is the fact that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has accommodated 
many insurgent groups operating in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond 
(Withington, 2002, p. 41). In addition to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, the 
Mujahideen-e-Khaq of Iran, the Xinjiang Liberation Front of China, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahuddin operating in Jammu and Kashmir, all took 
advantage of Taliban hospitality and military aid.  An important concern here is the Taliban 
regimehas recognized Chechnya as an independent state. Hence, the Taliban regime proves 
to be “potentially mortal danger to regional stability to all pro-Russian regimes, Russian 
influence and ultimately, Russia’s own borders” (Lieven, 2002, p. 252).
The war in Afghanistan marked the increasing dominance of the Pakistan supported Taliban 
movement over most parts of the country. This is another major source of concern to Russia 
as well as number of regional actors, especially India, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. On January 16, 2001, Kabul recognized the government of the breakaway 
republic of Chechnya and allowed the Chechens to open an embassy in Kabul. Following 
this, there were reports that 200 Taliban cadres had left to fight in Chechnya, while Chechen 
refugees, particularly young boys and the families of leading Chechen commanders began 
to arrive in Kabul and Kandahar. A joint training camp was set up in Mazar-I- Sharif to train 
Islamic dissidents from all over Central Asia. (Public Opinion Trends, 19 January 2001, p. 
3). These developments clearly endangered the Russian security. Moscow’s ambassador to 
Dushanbe, Maxim Peshkov, told reporters in the Tajik capital “the situation in Afghanistan is 
the number one problem for Central Asia and Russia. (POT, Afghanistan Series, 19 January 
2001).  Moscow was enraged by the presence of guerilla training camps in Afghanistan and 
hoped that the United Front will close these facilities if they destroy the Taliban. That hope 
could have been realized with the front’s liberation of Mazar-I-sharif, Herat, Kunduz, and 
Kabul, and the United states air force attacks on “terrorists training facilities” (Withington, 
2002, p. 43).It is said that many of these camps which were used to train Chechen militants 
have also had links with al Qaeda.
Moreover, if the coalition forces are defeated in Afghanistan, Russian security itself could 
be at stake more directly. Indeed, there is a common misperception about terrorist groups as 
being only anti-American. If Bin Laden and his followers see the U.S. as their great enemy, 
this has not been the case for all the jihadists based in the Afghan “emirate” of the Taliban. 
Indeed before the 9/11 American attack, it was believed, there were at least 14 militant groups 
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or organizations in Afghanistan. If one cannot reject the idea of some kind of influence of 
Bin Laden on some of them, at least the Uzbek IMU is the best example (Gunaratna, 2006, 
p. 237). It is also mistake to think that Al Qaeda had a direct control on all of them and 
was able to impose its vision to the other groups. Some militant groups saw the U.S. only 
as one of the main enemies, with Russia as an equally important enemy. For example, for 
al-Suri, in the 1990s, there was an aggressive alliance between Iran, Russia, the United 
States, and Central Asian states, against the Taliban and their jihadist allies. Some religious 
extremist, including some Afghan-Arabs and Middle Eastern jihadists, were much more 
interested in continuing the Soviet-Afghan war, this time in Central Asia and in Russia, than 
to wage a war against the Americans who are deemed the strongest opponent. This practical 
approach was theKhattab network, which was, at least in the 1990s, as important, or even 
more important, than the one Bin Laden was able to establish during the same period in 
Afghanistan (Gerges, 2007, p. 57). Others chose the path of Khattab, even without being 
part of his group. Some jihadists were indeed “wanderers”, without any strong affiliation to 
one group or another in Chechnya, just present to fight the state that they thought was the 
main oppressor of Muslims (Collins, 2002, pp. 96-97). Some Chechen radical Islamists, 
like Basayev, have been trained in militant camps in Afghanistan (Bowker, 2007, p. 79), 
and Chechen militants are still based in the neo-Taliban strongholds, like Waziristan. If 
the United States fails in Afghanistan, it is clear that the international terrorists would find 
a safe-haven there and would not only target the US but also Russia. Indeed, due to the 
weakness of the Central Asian states, and the situation in the North Caucasus, it is very 
possible to see the jihadist reorient their actions at least partially against Russia. Lastly, in a 
new Afghan “emirate”, Chechen militants would also be given a safe-haven. The Chechen 
independence had already been recognized officially by the Taliban. As the neo-Taliban are 
much closer to the jihadist way of thinking than the Taliban before them, it is fair to assume 
that a new Afghan Emirate led by the neo-Taliban will focus on the jihadist regional causes 
of their allies, i.e. the jihads for the Ferghana Valley and the North Caucasus, among others. 
Currently the Russians seem to take a greater interest in stabilizing and supporting the 
Karzai government. It cancelled most of the Afghan debt as a sign of support (Online Web, 
2008), and relations linked to defence and weaponry are growing. (RIA Novosti, 2002) 
Russia even seems to appreciate the importance of perceiving security and development in 
this region from a “Greater Central Asian” approach, which at last takes into account the 
fact that fate of Central Asia and Afghanistan are linked (Li, 2006).
From the above discussions one can interpret that any attempt to find an alternative to 
Russian presence in the Central Asian region has had mixed results. The early phase 
following independence was marked by a search for solidarity and co-operation with Islamic 
neighbours. The competition among Islamic states and their different brands of religious 
ideology and the rising threat of Taliban-inspired fundamentalist movements had a negative 
impact on relationship with these neighbours. The level of economic and technological 
development of these states could also not become a pull factor. Only Turkey as a secular-
democratic state has some visible presence in the economic and cultural sphere. Although 
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Central Asian States have relations with major Islamic powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan, these are not going to be alternatives to Russia or other global powers engaged 
with the region.
Conclusion
Given the changing contours of the strategic environment and Russia’s geo-strategic and 
security interests in the region, her close geographical proximity and as important regional 
power, Russia must not only sustain its current diplomatic thrust in the region, but also 
reinvigorate it to a far higher level. The geo-political stability in Central Asia has not only a 
direct impact on Russia’s economic interests in the region, but also has greater security 
implications on the ongoing separatist movements in Chechnya and Dagestan. Therefore, it is 
pertinent that Russia and the Central Asian states  act collectively to maintain regional stability, 
which has wider ramifications over regional security developments.The task should not be left 
to the US alone which is physically far away from this region and is obsessed with A1 Qaeda.
The exit strategy and localization process initiated by United States in Afghanistan has 
compelled Central Asian Republics and Russia to think about their security interests after 
US troops withdrawal 2014.
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